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Doctors (and, following the order in 
the title of this lecture, I shall come to 
would-be doctors later) figure in our law 
reports in several guises - as plaintiffs or' 
defendants in civil actions, as witnesses 
and, lastly and more commonly, as 
experts. For the purposes of this lecture, 
I am confining. my interest to doctors qua 
doctors as otherwise there are, of course, 
numerous instances of doctors figuring in 
the law reports as ordinary litigants. 
Obviously there is nothing to preclude 
doctors from joining in this national 
pastime which is court litigation and, as I 
said, there are several reported cases of 
doctors, even some of the most reputable 
ones, suing or being sued for damages in 
connection with traffic accidents, whereas 
in relation to traffic accidents I am 
obviously more concerned with doctors as 
experts assessing, for instance, (and this 
is by no means easy) the percentage of 
an injured person's permanent incapacity 
for the purposes of an action for damages. 
I should like to start with a famous 
civil case in which a doctor unfortunately 
figures as defendant and I should like to 
do so because the case is concerned with 
the fundamental question of a doctor's 
responsibility arising out of the carrying 
out of his professional duties. The case, 
which is in the Law Reports (Vol. XXXV, 
Part 2, pages 55-56), was decided by the 
Court of Appeal on the 2nd April 1951. In 
this case a father, on behalf of his son 
under age, sued a doctor for damages aris-
ing out of the fact that the son, who was 
under the .professional care of the doctor, 
allegedly through the doctor's negligence, 
lost his foot and suffered permanent debil-
itation. Warrants of seizure and of impe-
diment of departure, as well as a garnishee 
order, were also issued against the doctor. 
The facts of the case were as follows. 
On the 18th March 1944 the doctor per-
formed an operation on the boy's foot 
which had been paralysed through poliom-
yelitis. Next day the doctor visited the 
patient and, as he stated in evidence, 
found everything normal. He failed to 
visit him on the 20th but on the 21st he 
did visit him, after having first declined, 
on the insistence of the person who called 
him and he found the boy flushed and 
feverish. Again on the 22nd he failed to 
see the boy and on the 23rd the boy's 
mother took him to the doctor's house. 
The doctor tore open the bandage and, 
after some medication, applied another 
bandage on everything there was. On the 
25th the boy's mother again went to the 
doctor and informed him that in the 
exposed part of one of the toes there was a 
blister. Notwithstanding this information, 
the doctor failed to go and see the boy. 
From he 26th onwards the mother started 
taking the boy to the doctor daily and the 
doctor continued to treat him regularly 
till August of the same year when the boy's 
foot, gangrenous and mummified, dropped 
off spontaneously as Professor Peter Paul 
Debono, to whom the boy's family had 
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turned, was uncovering it. The medical 
experts appointed by the Court reached 
the conclusion in their report that the 
gangrenous process had begun from one 
to two days after the operation, that is to 
say between the 19th and 20th March, 
and c(tltinued on its normal course till 
the foot's spontaneous amputation four 
months later and that the position could 
have been remedied had the doctor be-
come aware of it in time. They said that 
in this case gangrene was occasioned by 
the pressure of the plaster bandage, which 
seriously obstructed the circulation, and 
added that it was to be expected that after 
such an operation the foot should swell 
and the bandage consequently tighten. 
They admitted that the doctof had not 
noticed the condition of the boy's foot in 
those first days after the operation, but 
felt that this was due . to a professional 
error of judgment, an error in the inter-
pretation of clinical facts, and that this er-
ror was not due to negligence. 
Both the. court of first instance and 
the Court of Appeal, however, disagreed 
with the experts' conclusion that there 
was no negligence, and this on the basis 
of the statements of the experts them-
selves. It was remarked in the judgment 
that, according to the experts themselves, 
the critical period was between the 19th 
and the 23rd and during this period the 
doctor had failed to see the patient on 
the 20th and the 22nd, and it was only on 
the insisten~e of a certain person that he 
wen to see him on the 21st. The experts 
themselves stated in their evidence that 
common prudence did in fact suggest that 
the doctor should have seen the boy also 
on the 20th and added that in the period 
between the 20th and the '23rd the doctor 
should have gone to see the boy irrespect-
ive of any symptomatology which the boy 
presented on the 20th, but by reason only 
of the fact that the operation had taken 
place on the 18th, considering the nature 
of the operation itself. The experts them-
selves also stated that in this period be-
tween the 20th and the 23rd the symptoms 
especially local ones, increased in severity 
and this should have caused the doctor to 
become aware of the gangrenous process, 
had he in fact gone to see his patient. 
Indeed, as I said, it was on the basis of 
the experts' findings themselves that both 
Courts reached the clear conclusion that 
there had been neglig.ence on the part of 
the doctor. 
. The Court of Appeal agreed with the 
Court. below that on the facts as est-
ablished the doctor had not used the 
diligence of a '''bonus paterfromUia.s" and 
had shown imprudence in not having con-
tinually kept, as he shCflld have done, an 
eye on the patient in the days after the 
operation when the dangef of gangrene 
was so much present and could have been 
avoided by his attention. He was thus at 
fault and was responsible for the con-
sequences. 
The Court of Appeal, quoting from 
Italian and French text-writers, held that 
it was clear from the authorities and the 
decided cases that a doctor was not res-
ponsible for damages resulting from an 
excusable professional ·error and this was 
excusable if it stemmed from the uncer-
tainties and imperfections of the sciences 
and not from negligence or sheer incapa-
city. But the position was, of course, dif-
ferent if the error was, as the Court put 
it, "grossoLano", which, Uterally translated, 
means "coarse", or if the damage was at-
tributable to his not showing the prudence, 
diligence and attention of a "bonus pater-
famvLias", which, as you know, is the 
ordinary standard of 'care reqllired by our 
law. This proposition, as indeed also the 
writ of summons itself, was based on the 
basic provisions of Sections 1074 and 1075 
of the Civil Code, which provide that 
"every person ...... shall be liable for the 
damage which occurs through his fault" 
and that "a person shall be deemed to be 
at fault if, in his own acts, he does no't 
use the prudence, diligence and attention 
of a "bonus paterfamvLias" but "no person 
shall, in the absence of an express pro-
vision of the Law, be liable for any damage 
caused by want of prudence, diligence or 
attention in a higher degree". 
Another class of reported cases in 
which doctors figure, this time as plain-
tiffs, in civJI suits and which illustrate the 
eternal hazards of credit, relate to doctors' 
actions for the payment of professional 
fees. First of all, as you know, there is 
prescription, which is here used not as a 
medical term but as a Maltese and Con-
tinental legal term denoting one of the 
causes of extinction of obligations (by 
lapse of time) which is in general justified 
by the social necessi'ty of ensuring the 
certainty of juridical relationships, but -
and I quite realize this - can be also most 
infuriating. On the other hand, the running 
of prescriptive time may in some cases be 
suspended or interrupted. Procedurally 
prescription is a defence against an action 
and in civil matters cannot be raised by 
the Court of its own motion, but unfor-
tunately is quite often cheerfully raised by 
the defendant, and this at any stage of the 
proceedings, even on appeal. One of the 
facts of life of universal application is that 
there is very little enthusiasm for payment, 
at least when one is at the paying end. No 
doubt you all know that, according to law, 
actions by physicians, surgeons and 
obstetricians to get payment for their 
visits or operations are barred by the 
lapse of two years. So please beware. 
I am now thinking of one particular 
doctor (whose case, decided by the First 
Hall of the Civil Court in 1928, figures in 
Vol. XXVII, Part 2 pages 53-55 of the Law 
Reports) who must have found the defence 
that was set up against his action for the 
payment of professional fees perhaps much 
more disconcerting than just prescription. 
The patient, defendant in the suit, did not 
contest the fact that he had called the 
doctor to make use of his professional 
services, nor indeed did he contest the 
bill. His defence was only that the treat-
ment which the doctor had given him, not-
withstanding the doctor's repeated assur-
ances that it would have been. efficacious, 
had not produced the anticipated effect 
and that in fact he was worse. He added 
that he would not have entrusted his case 
to the doctor if he had not assured him 
about the result of the treatment, and in 
fact he had told the doctor not to start 
the treatment if he did not feel certain 
of its efficacy. It was established that the 
treatment had negative results and Profes-
sor Peter Paul Debono expressed the 
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opinion that the patient's illness was 
incurable. 
The Court in this delicate case had re-
gard to the relevant circumstances. It held 
that it was clear that the paymen of a doc-
tor's professional fees could not be subject-
ed to the condition of the patient's recov-
ery, notwithstanding the docor's assurances 
and expressions of confidence ~n the result 
of the treatment which, rightly or· wrong-
ly, he thought would be conducive to re-
covery, provided - and this is a very im-
portant proviso - there was no evident 
bad faith or evident abuse of the exercise 
of his profession on the part of the doctor. 
In this case, bad faith, the Court said, 
"could not be presumed solely from the 
negative result of the treatment or Pro-
fessor Debono's opinion that the patient's 
illness was incurable". The case was, of 
course, decided on its own merits, due al-
lowance being made for the possibility in 
other circumstances of the presence of bad 
faith or abuse in the exercise of the profes-
sion, and this is quite understandable. 
As I said, the Law Reports also show 
some interesting cases of doctors as de-
fendants in criminal cases. I should like in 
the first place to refer to a reported case 
decided in 1917 which concerned a charge 
against a Sliema doctor of having refused 
to give his professional services when 
called upon so to do in an urgent case and 
which indeed relates to what is often an 
agonizing situation for a medical piact-
itioner (Law Reports, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, 
pages 1083-1086). As you know, the Medic-
al and Kindred Professions Ordinance 
(Chap. 51) provides in section 6 that it is 
the duty of every licensed medical pract-
itioner to practise his profession whenever 
he is so required in cases of emergency, 
whether by day or by night, and without 
any wilful delay to render his aid and 
prescribe the necessary remedies. The 
Ordinance also prescribes penalties for 
offences against this provision. 
The facts of this particular case were 
as follows. In the early hours of the 19th 
August 1917 a man was roused from his 
slumbers by a kind-hearted woman who 
told him that another woman, a neigh-
bour, was ill and she asked for his help. 
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He found the sick woman so ill that he 
called a priest and the priest suggested 
that he should call a doctor. He then em-
barked on a series of fruitless peregrina-
tions. Having gone first to one doctor with 
negative result, he then went to the 
doctor concerned in this case, making 
known to the person who peeped out of the 
window the object of his visit and the 
urgency of the case, but was informed by 
that person that the doctor could not at-
tend to the case as he had only shortly 
come home. After having unsuccessfully 
sought another doctor at his residence and 
also unsuccessfully requested the address 
of another from the duty police officer, the 
man went again to the doctor concerned, 
but again with negative results. Then he 
went, again unsuccessfully, to call another 
doctor. The net result was that up to six 
o'clock in the morning no doctor had gone 
to see this woman. In court the doctor 
concerned pleaded in justification indis-
position resulting from tiredness which 
necessitated rest. The Court of Magistrates 
held that, according to the teachings of 
jurists, the reason justifying a doctor's re-
fusal to give his professional services when 
so required in cases of urgency had to be 
grave, and that not only had this doCtor 
f~iled to show sufficient justification for 
his refusal, but the evidence showed that 
his defence was groundless. On appeal by 
the doctor, the appellate Court affirmed the 
judgment. It observed that the conditions 
for the existence of the contravention in 
question were, first, the urgency of the 
case in connection with which a licensed 
doctor is required to give his professional 
services and, secondly, the unreasonable-
ness of his refusal to do so. The Court add-
ed that one could only adjudicate upon the 
urgency of the request on the basis of the 
circumstances antecedent to or concomit-
ant with the request itself, that is to say 
on the basis of the circumstances in which 
the case presented itself and not of the sub-
s,equent circumstances; these might con-
ceivably disclose that the apprehended ur-
gency did not as such exist whereas it 
could be shown that the circumstances 
themselves did in fact justify at the time 
the apprehension of that urgency. With re-
gard to the second point, the Court said 
that, in order to decide on the reasonable-
ness or otherwise of the doctor's refusal, 
it was necessary to have regard to the 
ground for the refusal, the ascertainment 
of the existence of such ground and its ap-
preciation being left to the Court. Quoting 
from the French legal writers Chauveau 
and Helie, the Court made it clear that the 
assessment of such g.round could not in-
deed be left to the individual appreciation 
of the practitioner to whom the request 
was made. Obviously this is a very delicate 
matter involving a fine appreciation of all 
relevant factors. 
Other reported cases in this class 
relate to another important duty of medic-
al practitioners under he Prevention of 
Disease Ordinance (Chap. 59). Section 5 
of this Ordinance provides as follows: 
'every' medical practitioner attending on 
or called in to visit a patient shall forth-
with, on becoming aware that the patient 
is suffering from a disease to which this 
part of the Ordinance applies, send to the 
Superintendent a certificate stating the 
name, age and address of the patient, 
and the disease from which, in the opinion 
of such medical practitioner, the patient 
is suffering". This provision, according to 
Section 38 of the same Ordinance with 
which it must be read, applies even where 
there exists only a reasonable suspicion 
that the disease is one of those specified 
in the said Section 38. A case of a charge 
under this Ordinance against a medical 
practitioner came before the Court of Ma-
gistrates in 1938. It did not present much 
difficulty from the evidential point of view. 
In this case, reported in Vol. XXX, Part 1, 
pages 543-549 of the Law Reports, it was 
established in ,evidence that the doctor, 
who had a sick child under his care, act-
ually declared to the child's mother that 
the case was one of diphtheria, gave the 
child sev'eral injections of anti-diphtheria 
serum, warned the child's parents to say 
nothing about the case, created in them 
the fear that they would be arrested if 
they talked and stating that if he was 
caught he would be fined twenty pounds, 
asked them to hide the empty phials, ad-
vised them to remove their young daught-
er from the house, warned them not to 
admit anybody into the house and, not-
withstanding all this, sent no certificate 
to the Sanitary Authorities and then ex-
pected to get away with it in Court. It is 
not surprising in the circumstances that 
when he took the witness stand he only 
made his position worse. 
The case is interesting only because 
it involved an important question about 
prescription. We have seen that prescrip-
tion, as a cause of extinction of civil oblig-
ations is not too friendly to the medical 
practitioner who is a little remiss in send-
ing his bills. But in a criminal case, on the 
other hand, prescription can only operate 
in favour of the person cha,rged, in this 
case the medical practitioner concerned. 
The Court of Magistrates accepted the 
doctor's plea, as it held that thE' doctor 
had declared the child 'to be suffering from 
diphtheria on the 20th December 1937 
and the summons had been served on him 
on the 22nd March 1938, that is to say 
more than three months aHer the com-
mission of the contravention. As in such 
cases the prescriptive period is 3 months 
the criminal action was thus barred by 
prescription and the doctor was acquitted. 
On appeal by the Attorney-General, how-
ever, the appellate Court reversed the 
judgment, . found the doctor guilty and 
fined him. It held that the offence in ques-
tion was a continuing one, that is to say 
one in which the course of action continues 
de die vn diem, and in such cases the pres-
criptive period only commences to run on 
the day when the violation of the law 
ceases. In this case the appellate Court 
held that the permanence of the anti-jurid-
ical state ceased with the child's death, so 
as long as the child remained alive the 
doctor was still violating the law in not 
giving the prescribed notice. The boy 
died on the 23rd December 1937 at two 
o'clock in the morning, and the summons 
was served on the doctor on the 22nd 
March 1938. The criminal action against 
the doctor stood, saved, probably to the 
doctor's bitter disappointment, by just a 
narrow margin. Another question in con-
nection with a charge against a doctor 
under this section arose in a reported case 
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of 1954 (Vol. XXXVIII, Part IV, pages 786-
788 of the Law Reports). The doctor con-
cerned submitted through his counsel that 
the provision in question was not to be con· 
strued as imposing a duty to send the 
pr,escnibed certLfica:te on eachdoC<t0'r !hav-
ing the patient under his care or called 
to visit him. It was contended on behalf of 
the doctor that it was sufficient if only one 
doctor sent the certificate in cases, like 
the one in question, of a consultation 
where there was 'thus more than one doctor 
involved. The Court - and its view was 
endo!'sed by the appellate Court - was 
unable to accept this contention in view 
of the clear wording of the law which. 
after all, was also consonant with the ratio 
legis in as much as otherwise, in the casE' 
of a plurality of doctors concerned, each 
might well rely on the other as to the 
sending of the certificate with the unfor-
tunafe consequence that no certificate 
might in the end be sent at all. 
Enough of this rather unhappy though 
very interesting subject of criminal pro-
secutions; I would ask you now to transfer 
your attention from the dock to the wit-
ness-box which, I know, can sometimes 
seem hardly less unpleasant. In connection 
with this subject, I should like to refer to 
a case which, because it is only too recent, 
has not yet been reported but which may 
well eventually find its way into the Law 
Reports. This the case of Balzan v Ciantar 
which my colleagues and Ion the Court 
of Appeal decided on the 24th November 
of last year. 
No doubt you all know that where 
doctors are really and truly in fantastic 
demand as witnesses these days is in Rent 
Regulation Board cases. You also know 
that doctors are being continuously asked 
- I was going to say 'pestered' - to make 
out certificates attesting that one or the 
other or both of the parties in a rent case 
suffer from some disease or preferably 
from a multiplicity of ,them as, for the 
purpose of the assessment of the respect-
ive "hardship" of the parties, the more 
the diseases listed the greater appears to 
be the lessor's chance of recovering pos-
session of his building or the tenant's 
chance of retaining it. Whilst in the old 
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days to call a man "baswi" very likely led 
to a case of slander, nowadays the parties 
in a Hmt case sport their rupture as if it 
were a family heirloom. In our procedural 
system a medical certificate is in principle 
of no evidential value unless the doctor 
who subscribed it confirms its contents on 
oath in the witness-box. 
Now in the Balzan v. Ciantar case it 
was contended on behalf of the appellant 
before us in the Court of Appeal that a 
doctor's evidence as to the state of health 
of one of the tenants was merely an ex 
parte expression of opinion. It stated that 
a dootor having a person under his pro-
fessional care and called by that person 
to give evidence on his behalf may be ex-
pected to testify, whenever this is relevant 
to the case, not only on the illness with 
which that person is affected (which has 
never attracted any objection), but also 
on wlhrait that partioularr person: whose 
health background is after all normally 
known only to his personal doctor, should 
or should not do for the treatment, cure 
or relief of that illness. The doctor test-
ifies on whalt he himself knows about the 
patient as such, and this does not relate 
only to the illness whIch he has diagnosed, 
but also to what the patient, in the state 
of health in which he has been found to 
be, should or should not do on account of 
that state of health. Obviously, the Court 
added, both one and the other of these 
matters necessarily imply a certain sub-
jectivE' D-nprE'ciation. but in the circum-
stances this is in itself inevitable, and, con-
tained within proper limits, in normal 
circumstances is not procedurally wrong. 
May I, however, add. by way of a sad 
postscript to this, that I have at times seen 
medical ce·rtificates which looked elegantly 
tailor-made for the case, and some even re-
commended that the patient should have 
the particular house he was after. 
Lastly I should like to say something 
about doctors as court exper.ts. Mention of 
doctors as experts is to be found practically 
everywhere in our Law Reports. In our 
legal system, as you know, the expert is 
appointed by the Court itself and I feel 
that this system has much to commend it. 
We find doctors as experts in practically 
all reports of criminal trials on such 
charges as homicide and bodily harm. In 
one such case, which was decided by the 
Criminal Court in 1955 (Vol. XXXIX, Part 
IV, pages 914-915 of the Law Reports) the 
accused objected to the word car (clear) 
~n Itlh:e phmse "jesponuh g,1iaUrperi1v~u car 
taL-mewt" (,eXipose IbbJe vict~m to a clear 
danger of death) in the medical expe.rts' 
report, on the ground that it is exclusively 
for the jury to adjudicate on this faotor. 
The Court, however, overruled this objec-
tion on the ground that danger of death 
admits of certain gradations, ranging from 
remote danger to clear danger, and in the 
repor,t this was correlated with the traum-
atic effect, the study of which is a matter 
which falls within the technical compe,t-
ence of the medical experts. 
In civil matters, too, there are several 
reported cases relating to doctors as ex-
perts. In particula.r there was a time when 
the Courts held that it was impossible to 
entrust exper,ts with the examination of 
the question of the mental sanity of a 
person - usually a testator - who was 
already dead at the time (Vol. XX, Part 1, 
page 193 and Vol. XXIV, Part 1, page 794 
of the Law Reports). But more recently 
(Vol. XXXIV, Part 1, pages 108 to 133) a 
different view has been taken. 
An interesting case arose in 1947 and 
is to be found in Vol. XXXIII, Par.t 2, 
pages 73-74 of the Law Reports. In a case 
of separation the husband, who was the 
plaintiff and was alleging adultery on the 
part of his wife, requested the Court to 
appoint medical experts to ascertain whet-
her his wife, the defendant, was pregnant. 
The First Hall of the Civil Court held that 
in the field of private law the examination 
of the person of any of the parties for 
evidential purposes was not provided for 
and so, in the event of opposition on the 
part of the person concerned, such examin-
ation was not admissible. 
A similar case, but with a more 
modp.rn flavour, occurred in 1952 and is 
reported in Vol XXXVI, Part 1 pages 297-
298 of the Law Reports. In a case of ille-
gitimate filiation in which the plaintiff was 
alleging ,that the defendant was the father 
of her illegitimate child, the defendant 
asked the Court of Appeal to appoint an 
expert to carry out the necessary blood 
test on the plaintiff in order to exclude his 
paternity in respect of 1he child. The Court 
held that such a test was admissible when-
ever the parties consented to it. In this 
case both the plaintiff and the defendant 
had in fact consented; but as the mother 
was appearing in the case also as curatrix 
ad LiJteim of the child, the question arose 
whether in ,this capacity she could give her 
consent on behalf of the child. The Court 
held that as it was in the child's interest 
that his paternity be established in a de-
finitive manner and it did not appear that 
the test in quesion could be prejudicial 
to his health, it could in the circumstances 
supply this consent itself. A similar case 
is at present pending before us in the 
Court of Appeal and the relevant tests are 
actually being carried out. This, I think, 
evinces what I may call a prudent progress-
iveness in the Courts' approach to certain 
delicate problems. 
Now I should like to draw here a very 
firm line dividing the first part of my 
lecture dealing with doctors from the se-
cond: part concerning would-be doctors. 
But before dealing with these -"- and by 
would-be doctors I mean those who pur-
port to exercise the medical profession 
without being qualified doctors - I should 
like to refer very briefly to those who, 
though qualified doctors, seek to exercise 
the medical profession without having first 
obtained the necessary licence to practice 
medicine in these Islands and (since 1959) 
being registered in the Medical Register, 
as provided in Section 4 of the Medical and 
Kindred Professions Ordinance (Chap 51). 
A reported case of a foreign doctor 
or rather of a Maltese with a foreign me-
dical degree who practised medicine in 
Malta without the requisite licence came 
before our Courts in 1939 (Vol. XXX, Part 
IV, pages 637-641 of the Law Reports). A 
person with such a Maltese surname as 
Mifsud, but a graduate of a French Univer-
Is~ty wivhout a LOCQ,l Licence, ipl'iactised Ilne-
dicine here and was convicted. He did not 
appeal aginst his sentence, but thought he 
was smart enough to get round it. He made 
arrangements with a licensed Maltese 
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doctor for the opening of consulting rooms 
in Strait Street, Valletta and the locally 
licensed doctor was paid three pounds a 
week apart from two shillings in respect of 
every patient, and what was left after 
deducting expenses went to the man who 
was referred to as the French doctor This 
man was convicted of having contravened 
Section 4 of the said Ordinance (Chap. 51) 
and this time appealed against his convic-
tion. The appellate Court held that it had 
been established in evidence that the man 
examined patients, made diagnoses and 
prescribed treatment, and that this did in 
fact constitute the exercise of the medical 
profession. Even if he did this without 
payment, the offence of the unlawful exer-
cise of the medical profession would sub-
sist as the purpose of gain was not a ne-
cessary ingredient of this offense, thiS hav-
ing been established in the earlier case 
of SaiLunto. Nor did the presence of the 
licensed doctor alter the position at law 
for whether by himself or in conjunction 
with others, this man certainly did con-
travene the law. 
The SQiLunto case referred to in this 
judgment, also a reported case (Vol. XXV, 
Part IV, pages 914-917 of the Law Re-
ports), is an interesting one. It refers to 
a proper quack and a female one - not 
that female quacks are any worse than 
male ones. This woman admitted that she 
cured people by recommending or admin-
istering to them such innocuous substances 
as ordinary purges and that for this she 
used to get some food or a little money. 
The Court held that the offence of the un-
lawful exercise of the medical profession 
was not negatived by the fact that the sub-
stances prescribed or supplied were inno-
cuous (indeed by relying on such supposed 
cure the 'patient' in fact usually omitted 
Or' IdeiJJayed Ibhe proper oure) Oil' Itlhtat the 
pmoluments received were small. 
In another reported case (Vol. XXXII, 
Part IV, pages 918-922 of the Law Reports) 
a much more serious view was taken of 
the defendant's misdeeds. A man without 
any professional qualifications posed as a 
medicaL specialist and even assured his 
"patients" that they would be cured by 
him within a specified time, receiving pay-
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ment for his service. With intent to make 
gain, he prescribed treatments which were 
of no benefit whatever to his "patients". 
Moreover, he publicly represented himself 
as a doctor and even managed to figure as 
such in the telephone directory. The ap-
pellate Court held that t}1is was not a case 
of a mere violation of the said Section 
4 of Chap. 51, but that there were in this 
case all the ingredients of the much more 
serious crime of trujja under Section 322 
of the CriminaL Code, including that mtse 
en scene which is typical of this crime. The 
man was given six months in prison where 
it is hoped he had occasion to meditate on 
the long arm of the law and sort out the 
major from the minor offence. 
I do hope you have not found this 
il!nttJl!e guided tour of our ,giurisprudenza IUn-
interesting. I, for one, always feel that 
there is a ring of reality about decided 
cases which to me at least is often more 
appealing than the writing of theoret-
icians. I do realize that I have often had 
to focus your attention on those doctors, 
indeed extremely few, who have fallen foul 
of the law and this may perhaps on the 
whole have appeared to you et little dis-
mal. But it is the dark side of things that 
brings out more fully the brighter side 
and the medical profession in Malta has 
indeed a very bright record. After you 
have heard all this, I should not like any 
of you to look upon th~ law with even the 
slightest degree of unfriendliness, for may 
I conclude by saying - and I firmly be-
lieve this - that the law is indeed the 
best friend of an honest man. 
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